Written by Devin A.C. Dadah | Feb. 25th, 2024
Ethnicity is not a chosen phenomenon. Instead, it is something assigned to an individual at birth and is expressed through cultural, religious, linguistic, historical, and geographical institutions/attributes. Many in America confuse ethnicity and nationality, however the two are very distinct. National identity refers to the binding of individuals through common political aspirations. Nationality is inherently political, as members of a national identity desire their own nation through which they may self-govern. Individuals can belong to specific ethnic groups and also exist within a nation (in this discourse we will use Iraq as an example, since it is a rich signifier of diversity in ethnicity and nationality). For example, one could be ethnically Arab, but the nation which they belong to is Iraq. This discussion on ethnicity becomes significant, because ethnicity will often transcend boundaries. Many Arabs after WWI and WWII wished to unite into a singular Pan-Arab state. However, these aspirations were quickly squashed by colonial powers, as a Pan-Arab state would’ve threatened Western hegemony. Similarly, some Kurds aspire for a state of their own. In both instances, the governing bodies of Arabs and Kurds exist in distinct states. Arabs exist in independent states across Southwest Asia and North Africa, while Kurds exist in a relatively smaller region separated by the states of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. The capital of Iraq, Baghdad, was at one point the largest and most densely populated city in the world. This gave way to a diverse set of ethnic groups throughout the region. Today, Iraq is home to Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Persians, Shabak, Black Africans, Romas (Gypsies), Sluba, and many others. There are also sub-ethnicities, which are ethnicities within ethnicities: Mi’daan (Marsh Arabs) and Kurdish Failis are sub-ethnicities. Like all things, ethnic groups may face extinction (especially in Iraq). The Sabean-Mandaeans (Iraqi Baptists) are a pacifistic ethnoreligious group whose numbers went from 50,000 in 2006 to just 5,000 in Iraq as of 2017. Similarly, the Sluba (lone desert wanders believed to be remnants of European Crusaders) and Ali-Allahia are ethnic groups that are either in hiding, near extinction, or altogether extinct. Sometimes extinction of an ethnic group can be region specific. A group can be fleeing ethnic, political, or religious persecution and migrate out of their place of origin. In a unique instance in Iraq’s history, a large portion of Iraqi Jews (130,000) were airlifted by the Israeli government in Operation Ezra and Nehemiah (1951-1952), marking the the most climactic events of the Jewish exodus from Muslim-majority countries. Avi Shlaim, an Iraqi Arab-Jewish Israeli-British diplomatic historian and professor, denotes that only 3 Iraqi Jews live in Iraq today. This exodus of Iraqi Jews had a drastic effect on Iraqi society, as an ethnic group which had co-existed in the region for thousands of years (since 6th century BCE) suddenly vanished.
As mentioned there are ethno-religious peoples; a distinction in which ethnicity and religion are historically linked to one another. Oftentimes, to be a part of a religion in an ethnoreligious group means you have to be born into it. The Yazidis of Iraq are an ethnoreligious group and do not take converts into their religion. Forming into an ethnoreligious group takes many centuries of infusing customs, usually in an isolated setting. It is for these reasons that Yazidis are a mysterious people. Many Iraqis believe them to be “devil worshippers,” however Yazidis deny this title. In fact, they are forbidden from saying shaytan (“devil" in Arabic) and will even avoid words with similar syllables. Genetics have little to do with ethnic identification, however they can greatly inform certain ethnic groups. Recent studies have shown that the Yazidis are genetically closest to the Kurds. This is congruent with the Yazidi beliefs. They believe that they were the original religion of the Kurds before Islam came to the region. Genetics can also help determine things like skin tone and body type, which may assist in identification. Some scholars believe the Mi’daan to be direct descendants of ancient Sumerians, due to certain genetic features. This broadens the discussion on the formation of ethnicities and when they first came into existence. It is likely that ethnicity came into existence as soon as humanity started sorting themselves into different groups that were informed by differences in language, tradition, customs, and beliefs. However, to avoid anthropological debate we will focus on the ethnic formations of the modern-day. Some are ancient, like the Mi’daan, but many dominant ethnic groups exist to legitimize the nation-state. As Pan-Arabist aspirations faded into distant memory, Arab-states began asserting ethnic categorizations. An Arab in Morocco was now ethnically Moroccan, whereas an Arab in Iraq was now ethnically Iraqi. This became easy to adopt as the Arabic language and Arab culture varied from region to region. Suddenly an Arab living in America was no longer an Arab from the Fertile Crescent living in Dearborn, but an Iraqi Arab-American: ethnically Iraqi Arab with a nationality of American. It is important to understand these identities, these “tags'' (as it were), stem from a colonial European framework. The emergence of these identities are congruent with the formation of the modern-state in the 16th century. As states began forming strong institutions, the social institutions within the said state solidified hegemony around a meaningful collective social identity. Germans were no longer separated based on tribe or village, but were united under the prospect of being ethnically German. It is in these instances where ethnicity and nationality became interlinked.
Despite this simplification regarding the transference of post-medieval ethnic identities, it is important not to generalize an ethnic or national group. These institutions are made up of individuals with different ideas, attitudes, and education. For example, the Kurds of Northern Syria reject the idea of statehood. They have carved out their own autonomous region, they call Rojava. Their governance adheres to a democratic confederalist system; a form of libertarian socialism. Democratic confederalism rejects statehood, instead opting for a decentralized, pure democratic, multicultural self-governing cooperative economy. This presents a discussion on the diversity of political attitudes and ideologies. In our world, there exist a broad set of four types of political attitudes: radicals, liberals, conservatives, and reactionaries. Radicals prescribe something fundamentally wrong with institutions and seek to dismantle those institutions. Liberals believe that incremental change within an institution can fix certain problems within the institution. Conservatives value the status-quo and the continuity of institutions. Reactionaries mythologize the past and wish to completely upend the current order. These four political attitudes exist on a linear framework in which radicals exist farthest to the Left and reactionaries exist farthest to the Right. In the case of Rojava, they would be considered radicals as they opt for a complete dismantlement and restructuring of state institutions. There are also five types of political ideologies. Americans are most familiar with liberalism: an ideology which views life, liberty, and property as fundamental rights with a limited government to oversee said rights. Communism asserts prosperity for the majority through heavy state influence in order to curb inequality and individual wealth. Social democracy adopts liberal principles, but opts for heavier state influence for social spending and industry regulation. Fascism rejects freedom and equality, believing in strict hierarchies while individuals exist only to exercise the will of the state. Anarchism advocates for the elimination of the state, viewing the state as a fundamental threat to freedom and equality. Rojava is an anarchist society which views individuals and open councils as necessary components of self-governance. Their political system rejects authoritarianism, the predation of capitalism and the bureaucracy of state socialism. The political culture of a society is also a big component in societies social values. Societies which value self-expression and secularism may generate more individual freedom. On the other hand, if a society is traditionalist and oriented towards surviving, then they may reject certain ideas. The political culture of a society is dependent on many factors including resource availability and the dominance of specific ideologies. Rojava rejects traditionalist roles with regards to religion, race, and gender. They follow the ideological framework laid out by Abdullah Öcalan, which informs their self-governance. Rojavans do struggle to survive in a resource scarce, war torn region of Syria, but seemingly still maintain their principles.
Different ideas and attitudes can often lead to ethnic and national conflicts. It is important to understand in approaching these forms of conflict the effect that colonialism had on the Global South. In a very short time period, ethnic groups were forced to formulate into states, which led to the adoption of European ideas centering around how ethnicity and nationality should interact. European statehood adopted the approach of drastically simplifying ethnic relations into a hegemonic framework. This largely disregarded ethnic minorities, tribal, house, and geographical affiliations in favor of a dominant ethnic and national identity. In formerly-colonized states, conflicts may emerge due to a vying for political power between groups. In Iraq, the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia didn’t begin to occur until the 1991 Iraqi uprisings and the 2003 U.S. invasions of Iraq. While the distinction of Sunni and Shia are simply key distinctions in religious practice, it is elevated by some sense of nationalism and occasionally ethnicity.
[In a side note, tribal affiliation ignores the Sunni and Shia distinction. This means that family comes first and foremost. Many tribes in Iraq are mixed heavily with Sunni and Shia practitioners. In many instances a tribe may have a Shia sheikh overseeing a Sunni majority tribe or vice versa. To rebel against the sheikh on the basis of different religious practices would be inconceivable in Iraqi tradition.]
The sectarian divide between the two occurred as a result of political instability fueled by foreign interference. Specifically, a Sunni minority was holding the majority of political power over a Shia majority. During Ottoman (Sunni Muslims) ruled Iraq - Sunnis naturally where relied upon running government and military institutions. This was not a big issue, however when the U.S. invaded and began designating Sunnis to these positions the sectarian divide exploded. This is for a variety of reasons, mainly: Saddam Hussein, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the brutality of U.S. sanctions in the 1990s, and the vicious nature/sheer incompetence of U.S. occupation. In many cases, the material force (i.e. scarcity of resources) surrounding ethnic and national conflict are largely the main fuel. In the span of just a few months, Iraq went from a burgeoning society with a large middle class to (what many described as) a “pre-industrial age society.” This drastic shift in resource availability, combined with an occupying force and an estimated 34.2 firearms per 100 people, created a hotbed for conflict. Resisting Western intervention and protecting what would become what is of one's own, superseded everything else. Preventing future ethnic and national conflict around the world firstly has to stem from a place of genuine desire to help. The Bush Administration did not care for the situation of modern-day Iraqis. They did not care to understand the complex tribal, ethnic, national, and religious affiliations. Nor did they care to work with Iraqis in a meaningful and cooperative way. An exacerbation of conflict could have been easily avoided by putting in place simple institutional procedures. The solution wasn’t to fire 85,000 government employees, bomb critical civilian infrastructure, conduct 300 raids on people's homes every night, and stick Blackwater mercenaries onto innocent families. In no world would that be a viable solution, not in Iraq or any other place. Solutions stem from the root cause surrounding the material conditions of a society. Fixing this and promoting multiculturalism would end ethnic and national conflicts.